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Abstract
The thesis of this paper is that wage rates and earnings give misleading signals to public
and private decision makers regarding the social benefits of cenain kinds of education and
training (E&T) investments. The misleading signals are a result of the fact that (1) workers
and employers prefer employment contracts which either do not recognize or only partially
recognize differences in productivity among workers doing the same job and (2) imponant
dimensions of E&T accomplishment -- the skill, knowledge and competencies actually
developed -- are often not signaled to potential employers and therefore have limited influence
on the allocation of workers to jobs. The result is that there are significant productivity
differentials between workers who receive the same pay for the same job and some of these
productivity differentials are related to dimensions of E&T accomplishment that are not
efficiently signaled.
The paper develops a very simple signaling/implicit contracting model of the labor market.
True productivity depends on general intellectual achievement (GIA) and educational
credentials but GIA is unobservable, so pay is based on credentials and supervisory
assessments of doubtful reliability. As in most signaling models, the labor market tends to
overcompensate credentials and undercompensate academic achievement. The next section of
the paper refutes the simple wage equals individual MRP assumption by presenting evidence
of great variability of productivity across workers paid the same wage and doing the same job.
The paper then tests and rejects a weaker hypothesis that can justify an inference that
productivity and wage effects of GIA are equal -- namely that deviations of productivity from
wages are not cOITelated with academic achievement. Finally the paper develops a method
of estimating the true impact of academic achievement on productivity and applies it to data
on the productivity of 31,399 workers.
The analysis provides strong support for signaling theory. As predicted by the theory
when workers doing the same job are compared and academic achievement (the unobservable)
is controlled, the years of schooling signal is negatively associated with relative productivity.
When the schooling signal is controlled, academic achievement has a very strong positive
effect on relative productivity. This implies that academic achievement has a larger effect on
productivity than it has on wages. Academic achievement produces some private rewards for
it facilitates entry into higher paying occupations and promotions into better jobs. These are
the effects that are captured by standard wage regressions. In addition GIA has effects not
picked up by wage regressions. In each job the individual works he/she is doing a better than
average job but not receiving an appreciably higher wage as a result. The results imply that
schooling raises productivity primarily by improving academic achievement as it is measured
by standard tests. When it does not lead to gains on such tests, the credentials that graduates
receive tend to be overcompensated. The second major implication of the results is that
academic achievement is substantially under compensated if it is not signaled to the market
by a credential. This tendency to undeITeward academic achievement may help explain why
American high school students devote less time and energy to learning than their counterparts
abroad.
INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES AND THE SOCIAL PAYOFF
TO ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT
The thesis of this paper is that wage rates and earnings give misleading signals to
public and private decision makers regarding the social benefits of cenain kinds of education
and training (E&T) investments. The misleading signals are a result of the fact that (1)
workers and employers prefer employment contracts which either do not recognize or only
panially recognize differences in productivity among workers doing the same job and (2)
imponant dimensions of E&T accomplishment -- the skill, knowledge and competencies
actually developed -- are often not signaled to potential employers and therefore have limited
influence on the allocation of workers to jobs. The result is that there are significant
productivity differentials between workers who receive the same pay for the same job and
some of these productivity differentials are related to dimensions of E&T accomplishment that
are not efficiently signaled. Another consequence is that the private return to effon in school
is considerably smaller than the social return to such effon. This in turn may help explain
why American high school students devote less time to learning than their counterpans abroad.
I. The Puzzle: Why Are Labor Market Rewards for Academic Achievement
in High School So Modest?
According to the National Commission on Excellence in Education:
If only to keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in
world markets, we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educa-tional
system Learning is the indispensable investment required for success in the
"information age" we are entering. (p. 7).
Behind their call for higher standards and greater emphasis on academic subjects is the
assumption that most jobs require (or soon will require) significant competency in
communication, math and reasoning. To what extent does evidence from the labor market
suppon this claim? Are the workers who have these competencies receiving higher wages?
When learning is efficiently signaled by a credential, the answer is an unqualified yes.
In 1987 25 to 34 year old male (female) college graduates working full time full year earned
41 (48) percent more than comparable high school graduates and high school graduates earned
21 (23) percent more than high school dropouts. Good educational credentials are also
associated with a higher probability of employment.
When learning is not signaled by a credential, the answer is also yes but a highly
qualified yes. The labor market rewards for academic achievement (controlling for years of
2schooling) are modest and do not appear until many years after the completion of schooling.
In Willis and Rosen's (1979) structural model of college attendance and earnings, for example,
a one standard deviation increase in the math and reading scores of a high school graduate
who did not to go to college lowered the fIrst job's wage by 3.5 percent and raised the wage
25 years later by only 3.5 percent. Other data sets -- Project Talent, Class of 1972, NLS
Youth -- yield similarly modest estimates of the private payoffs to academic achievement for
those who do not go to college. 1
Correcting the Willis and Rosen results for measurement error and the restricted range
of the test score distribution increases the estimated effect of academic achievement to a
modest 2 percent wage gain per grade level equivalent.2 Consequently, the puzzle remains.
Credentials have large effects on earnings even when good measures of what has been learned
are included in the regression. Good measures of the skills and knowledge taught in school
have small direct effects on earnings when credentials are controlled. One interpretation of
this fInding is that schooling develops or signals other economically productive talents such
as discipline, occupationally specifIc skills and low propensities to quit (Weiss, 1988). A
second interpretation is that signals of academic achievement have value even when actual
achievement is absent because employers fInd it very diffIcult to measure actual achievement.
Either way, it would appear that studying in school and substantially increasing one's
achievement test scores yields only modest rewards if credentials do not cenify the learning
to the world.
Does this imply that the social returns to improvements in general academic
achievement are equally small? This requires estimates of the productivity consequences of
an increase in academic achievement. The standard approach to such a question is to infer
the effect of academic achievement on productivity from its effects on wage rates. This
inference is justifIed by an assumption that either individuals are paid their individual marginal
revenue products or that discrepancies between wages and MRP are random. Are such
assumptions justifIed? Can one conclude that if the wage effects of academic achievement are
small, productivity effects are equally small?
The answer provided by the paper is no. The assumption that wages = MRP is shown
to be invalid. Evidence is offered that there are large discrepancies between individual
productivity (MRP) and individual wage rates, (W) and that many of these discrepancies are
systematically related to academic achievement. This evidence is consistent with signaling and
long term contracting theory and inconsistent with a perfect information auction model of
3employment contracts. The major empirical finding of the paper is that competencies
measured by "aptitude" and broad spectrum achievement tests have considerably larger effects
on productivity than on wage rates.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 of the paper develops a very simple
signaling/implicit contracting model of the labor market. True productivity depends on general
intellectual achievement (GIA) and educational credentials but GIA is unobservable, so pay
is based on credentials and supervisory assessments of doubtful reliability. As in most
signaling models, the labor market tends to overcompensate credentials and undercompensate
academic achievement. Section 3 refutes the simple wage equals individual MRP assumption
by presenting evidence of great variability of productivity across workers paid the same wage
and doing the same job. Section 4 of the paper tests and rejects a weaker hypothesis that can
justify an inference that productivity and wage effects of GIA are equal -- namely that
deviations of productivity from wages are not correlated with academic achievement. The
fifth section analyzes the effect of academic achievement and years of schooling on
productivity relative to other occupants of the same job. Section 6 reviews evidence on the
effect of schooling and relative productivity on within-job relative wage rates.
The analysis provides strong suppon for signaling theory. As predicted by the theory
when workers doing the same job are compared and academic achievement (the unobservable)
is controlled, the years of schooling signal is negatively associated with relative productivity.
When the schooling signal is controlled, academic achievement has a very strong positive
effect on productivity. This implies that academic achievement has a larger effect on
productivity than it has on wages. Academic achievement generates private rewards primarily
by enabling entry into better schools and by facilitating entry into higher paying occupations
and promotions into better jobs. These are the effects that are captured by standard wage
regressions. Academic achievement also has effects that are not picked up by a wage
regression. In each job the individual works he/she is doing a better than average job but not
receiving a comparably higher wage as a result. The empirical findings suggest that when
academic achievement is not signaled to the labor market by a credential, it tends to be under
compensated. Another implication is that if the adult test score/schooling correlation arises
because of screening rather than learning, educational credentials are significantly
overrewarded, particularly in blue collar, clerical and service jobs. The final section of the
paper discusses the implications of these findings for growth accounting, for benefit cost
analysis and for educational policy.
4II. A Signaling/Implicit Contract Perspective on the
Economic Rewards for Academic Achievement
There are a number of reasons why workers and employers may prefer employment
contracts which do not pay individual workers their individual marginal product: the
unreliability of the feasible measures of individual productivity (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980), risk
aversion on the part of workers (Stiglitz, 1974), productivity differentials that are specific to
the firm (Bishop, 1987), the desire to encourage coworker cooperation and prevent
sabotage(Lazear 1986) and union preferences for pay structures which limit the power of
supervisors. In addition, compensation for differences in job performance may be non-
pecuniary -- praise from one's supervisor, more relaxed supervision, or a high rank in the
firm's social hierarchy (R. Frank, 1984).
A study of how individual wage rates varied with job performance found that when
people hired for the same or very similar jobs are compared, the elasticity of relative starting
wage rates with respect to a ratio scale measure of relative productivity is no greater than .08
(Bishop, 1987a). After a year at the firm, the more productive workers were more likely to
be promoted, but the elasticity of the relative wage with respect to reported productivity was
still quite low. The elasticity was .2 in nonunion firms with about 20 employees and zero in
unionized establishments with more than 100 employees and in nonunion establishments with
\
more than 400 employees.
If relative wage rates only partially compensate the most capable workers in a job for
their greater productivity, why don't they obtain promotions or switch to better paying firms?
To some degree they do, and this explains why workers who score high on tests are both
higher paid and more likely to be employed. But the sorting process is not completely
effective because employers cannot accurately predict the future productivity of job applicants
or current employees. In addition they usually lack information on "aptitude" test scores or
grade point averages that would allow them to predict that component of an employee's
productivity that is associated with academic achievement. While college transcripts are often
requested and used by employers, most employers do not request high school transcripts. A
1987 survey of small and medium employers who were members of the National Federation
of Independent Business found that only 14.2 percent obtained high school transcripts prior
to hiring a high school graduate (Bishop and Griffen forthcoming). Malizio and Whitney's
(1984) survey of large employers found that only a handful used high school transcripts to
select which applicants to interview, and the majority never requested a transcript at any point
5in the hiring process. One of the primary reasons for this is that very few employer requests
for transcripts are honored. Nationwide Insurance, for example, had over 1,200 job applicants
sign requests for high school transcripts in 1982 and received only 93 responses. When the
personnel officer asked school staff why transcripts were not forthcoming, he was told they
were "too busy". A second reason why employers generally do not use high school transcripts
to help make hiring selections is the hiring delays that would result. Schools are often tardy
in responding to such requests. Employers, on the other hand, want to make a fast decision.
They generally have little notice of openings. In only 23% of the hiring events sampled by
the NCRVE employer survey (1982) did the employer have more than 2 weeks notice of the
opening. The desire for speed results in 65 percent of job openings being filled within two
weeks. Despite limited use of high school transcripts in selecting employees, employers
believe that grade point averages are good predictors of future productivity. A policy
capturing experiment with a nationwide sample of 750 employers found that employer ratings
of completed job applications were more affected by high school grade point average than any
other single worker characteristic (Hollenbeck and Smith, 1984).
Referrals by teachers, principals and counselors are another way in which information
on academic achievement becomes available to employers. The teachers in occupationally
specific programs often provide such referral services but most high school students are not
in these programs. Only 3.5 percent of workers report their current job was obtained through
the efforts of their school (Rosenfeld, 1975). Most teachers do not have the contacts
necessary and do not view developing such contacts to be a part of their job description.
Another reason why teacher referrals are uncommon and recommendation letters so bland is
that recommenders take a risk if they commit anything negative to paper. The threat of
damage suits by unsuccessful job applicants and the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act
have caused school staff to become extremely careful about what they divulge about students.
Tests are probably the best way to evaluate academic achievement. However, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 1971 Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures prohibit the use of a test on which minorities or women score below white males
unless the employer can prove that the test is a valid predictor of performance on jobs at that
firm. Each firm proposing to use a test had to do its own validity study separately on blacks
and whites (29C.F.R.S607.5(b); Wigdor, 1982). Small firms found the costs prohibitive and
did not have enough employees to do such a study. The firm also had to prove that no other
test or selection method was available that was equally valid but had less adverse impact.
6Since there are hundreds of potential selection methods with less adverse impact, the firm was
potentially obligated to prove that all of these alternatives were less valid predictors of job
performance than the one selected. These guidelines caused many firms to drop tests
altogether, while other firms used the test only to screen out the bottom 10 or 20 percent of
job applicants, rather than to select those with the highest scores (Friedman and Williams,
1982). The NFIB survey found that in 1987 only 2.9 percent of recently hired workers at
these firms had completed an aptitude test as part of the application process.
Employers prohibited from using tests of general intellectual achievement (GIA) in their
hiring decisions are likely to respond by giving greater weight to visible worker characteristics
such as years of schooling which correlate highly with GIA.3 The use of schooling as a
screening device results in coworkers having very similar amounts of schooling. Only 20 to
25 percent of the total variance of schooling is within job variance. For test scores in contrast
about 44 percent of the population variance is within job variance (Hunter and Hirsh, 1987).
Wage regressions estimated in data sets affected by such a prohibition will probably yield
higher schooling coefficients and lower test score coefficients.
Assume, for example, competitive labor markets, rational profit maximizing employers
and a true relationship between productivity (PI) and observable credentials (S) and
unobservable GIA of the following form:
(1) P = 30 + alGIA + azS + U
Twenty seven percent of the work force has less than one year of tenure (Horvath
1981). Lacking information on GIA, let us assume employers use regressions of measured
productivity (P) on credentials (S) and interview performance (I) for previous new hires to
develop rules for selecting new hires and setting initial compensation. General intellectual
achievement is related to S and I by GIA = go + glS + gzl +v where GIA and I are defined
in SD units, cov(lu) =0 and gz < 1. Thus, the wage function for new hires is:
(2) W. = 30 + algo + (algI + az)S + algzl
For workers with more than one year of tenure let us assume that compensation is set
equal to a productivity expectation (P) that is based on credentials and a supervisory
7assessment (R). This supervisory assessment is an imperfect measure of a weighted average
(P) of past productivity levels (Po, . . Po) calculated using weights, Wt= (wo, . . wo)'
(3) R = P + E. 0 0
=2: wfJ"Z:.wt
t=O 1=0
+E.
The compensation schedule will be:
(4) W" = PO+I= 'Co + clR + c2S
Supervisor ratings cOlTelateonly .6 with ratings made by another supervisor and .43 with work
sample measures of job performance. Repeated measurement increases reliability only
marginally (Hunter, 1983; King, Hunter and Schmidt, 1980). This means that the variance of
t: is considerable. Hashimoto and Yu (1980) have examined optimal pay structures when the
measure of productivity is unreliable and have demonstrated that the tendency to compensate
higher productivity with higher pay diminishes with the decline in the reliability of the
productivity measure. The coefficient on supervisory assessment (cl) in the wage function for
long term employees will consequently be considerably less than 1.4
Now enter an analyst whose assignment is to uncover the true relationship between
schooling, GIA and productivity. For a large sample of workers the analyst collects data on
wages, credentials and GIA (adult test scores) and estimates the following regression:
(5) W = bo + blGIA + b2S
Since the aggregate wage function is some mix of (2) and (4), the resulting estimator bl will
be smaller than the true effect, al> of test scores on productivity and the estimator b2 will
exaggerate the true effect of schooling net of adult test scores, a2. These results cOlTectly
characterize the private payoffs to the two dimensions of schooling. However, they do not
correctly characterize the pattern of social returns. An analyst who made the standard
assumption that W=P would obtain downward biased estimates of the effect of academic
achievement on productivity and upward biased estimates of the effect of credentials on
productivity. The evidence supporting this assertion and the empirical relevance of signaling
and implicit contracts theory is presented in the sections that follow.
8III. Are There Important Discrepancies Between Wage Rates and
Individual Marginal Revenue Products?
A direct test of Wi = Pi and of whether wage equations yield biased estimates of GIA' s
effect on productivity will be presented. A good way to conduct the test is to sample workers
who do the same job and are paid the same wage and measure their output directly. If output
varies substantially in such samples, Wj=Pj must be rejected.
A search for studies of output variability yielded 49 published and 8 unpublished
papers covering 94 distinct jobs.5 Their results are summarized in column 3 and 4 of Table
1 (a description of methods used to estimate CVs and the sources can be obtained from the
author). For a great many occupations physical measures of output or gross sales data were
the basis of these estimates of the standard deviation of productivity. The average ratio of
the standard deviation of output to mean output, coefficient of variation or CV, was 63 percent
for high level sales workers, 30 percent for sales clerks, 26 percent for clerical workers with
decision making responsibilities, 16.7 percent for other clerical workers and 14 percent for
hourly paid semi skilled factory workers. For other occupations estimates of output variability
were obtained from managers and industrial engineers who supervise individuals in the
occupation. The average CV was 36 percent for technical jobs, 33 percent for managerial jobs
and 27 percent for craft workers other than foreman and plant operators.
When a firm expands by hiring extra workers, it incurs significant fixed costs. It must
rent space, buy equipment, hire supervisors and recruit, hire, train, and payroll the additional
production workers. If output can be increased by hiring more competent workers, all of these
costs can be avoided and the firm's capital becomes more productive. These factors tend to
magnify the effects of work force quality on productivity. They imply that the ratio of the
standard deviation of worker productivity in dollars (SD$) to average worker compensation is
much larger than the productivity CV for that job (Klein, Spady and Weiss 1983; Frank 1984).
Estimates of productivity standard deviations (SD$) in 1985 dollars are reported in
column 4 of the table. In many cases the original study of output variability made no attempt
to estimate SD$'s, so the estimate has been calculated from the CV. The estimates of SD$
were derived as a product of the CV, the mean compensation for that job and the ratio of
value added to compensation for that industry (for manufacturing as a whole this ratio is
1.63). The value added to compensation ratio in retailing and in real estate was much too
high to be used as an adjustment factor. So for all sales occupations it was assumed that SD$
= CV times average compensation. Except for the higher level sales personnel and one of the
9administtative jobs, these workers were not paid commISSIOns or bonuses keyed to
productivity.
While specific estimates of SD$ can be debated, one would have to take the extteme
view that SD$ is almost zero before the basic conclusion that workers paid the same wage are
often significantly different in productivity would change. This implies that the Wj~j
assumption cannot possibly be true.
IV. Are Discrepancies Between Wage Rates and MRP Positively Correlated
With Academic Achievement?
There is, however, a weaker assumption that would make the standard wage equation
an unbiased estimator of GIA's impact on productivity, namely:
(6) Wi = E(PiIGIAj,Sj,X). where i indexes individuals
This also is testable in data containing measures of P, GIA, S and other characteristics of the
worker such as gender, ethnicity and experience (X) for people doing the same job and paid
the same wage. If employers know GIA and adjust pay accordingly, then in samples of
workers paid the same wage there should be no significant correlation between GIA and P
conditional on S and X. It is possible to test this hypotheses, for industrial psychologists have
conducted literally hundreds of studies (covering hundreds of thousands of workers) of GIA's
association with relative productivity in samples of job incumbents. Most of these studies
have been conducted in samples of workers whose hourly wage depended on seniority and not
performance.
The first column of Table 1 presents average correlations between GIA tests and
supervisory ratings of job performance from Ghiselli's (1973) comprehensive review of
published and unpublished studies of the validity of GIA tests.6 The second column of the
table presents correlations from the GATB Manual (Department of Labor, 1970) and from
other recent meta analysis. Clearly there is a significant positive correlation between GIA test
scores and job performance in a great variety of jobs. The sttength of the association is
apparently related to the cognitive demands of the job, for the raw validities are higher for
white collar and skilled blue collar jobs than for semiskilled factory work, ttansportation
equipment operatives and retail sales clerks. Analysis of data sets which have better measures
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of job performance (work sample measures rather than supervisory ratings) find even stronger
relationships between GIA and job performance (Hunter, 1983). Except for sales
representatives, and a few jobs where pay is affected by supervisory ratings, there was
minimal variation of wages in these samples not related to seniority.
In summary, there is considerable evidence that workers who do the same job at a firm
and are paid a wage that depends on seniority only, are often quite different in productivity
and these differences in productivity are often correlated with the employee's measured
academic achievement. These two results imply that GIA has larger effects on productivity
than on wage rates. A method of measuring the effect of GIA and years of schooling on the
discrepancy between a worker's productivity and his or her wage will now be described.
V. The Effect of Academic Achievement on a Worker's Productivity
Relative to Coworkers
Absolute measures of individual productivity that are comparable across jobs and across
people occupying a job are impossible to obtain, so it is never going to be possible to directly
estimate equation 1 in representative samples of the nation's workers. Wage data is available
for random samples of workers, but the parameters obtained from estimating equation 5 are
biased representations of the true relationship between productivity and its determinants. How
then can unbiased estimates of equation 1 be obtained? Measures of relative productivity are
often available for workers in specific jobs, so fixed effects estimation of equation 1 [where
narrowly defined jobs but not individuals have fixed effect~ on productivity] is one approach
that might be tried. Since, however, individuals are (1) selected for these jobs on the basis
of unobservable characteristics correlated with GIA and schooling and (2) are retained or fired
on the basis of realized productivity outcomes, selectivity problems may bias estimations of
equation 1 which allow for job-specific fixed effects even if the jobs studied are randomly
selected.
This paper takes a different approach. The objective is an estimate of a model that
is only minimally biased by selection problems that predicts the difference between the true
productivity, Pij, of the ilb worker in the jib job and that individual's wage, Wij' Models
predicting a proxy for this discrepancy are estimated in a data set which is as representative
as possible of the full range of jobs in the economy, thus selection bias is minimized. A
second advantage of this approach is that it yields direct tests of the key predictions of
signaling theory when schooling is a signal for GIA: PiFWjj is positively related to GIA and
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negatively related to schooling when GIA is controlled. Since the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients on these variables are zero, the crucial hypothesis tests are not hostage to
potentially controversial assumptions about the scaling of the discrepancy variable.7 The
relationship between true productivity, Pij, and that individual's wage, Wij is given by the
following identity:
(7) Pij'; Wij + (PifPj) - (Wif Wj) + (Pf W)
Assume that each of the terms on the right hand side of this identity has been modeled in
representative samples of the population as a function of Zij, a vector of worker characteristics-
-GIA, schooling, experience, gender, race, etc.:
(5') Wij = k,jLll
(8) PirPj = k,j~
(9) WirWj = .4J~3
(10) P-W. = Z..B.J J
=<J"'"-'+
If all four dependent variables have the same metric, an estimate of the determinants of true
productivity can be obtained simply by summing these four equations.
(1') Pij = k,ja = Z.j(LlI+~ +~3 +~)
The first of the four equations is the standard wage function. Equation (8) predicts the
worker"s "relative productivity", the deviation of the "i"th worker's marginal revenue product
net of current required training costs (Pi) from the marginal revenue product net of training
costs (Pj) of the average incumbent in the "j"th job at the firm. Evidence on how relative
productivity is related to worker characteristics is presented below. Equation (9) predicts the
worker's "within-job relative wage", the deviation of an individual's wage from the mean for
that job at the firm. Evidence on how the within-job relative wage relates to worker
characteristics is presented in section 6. Equation (10) predicts the difference between the
marginal revenue product net of current required training costs of the average incumbent in
the job (P) and the average wage for the job (Wj). Estimation of this relationship would
require direct measures of the marginal revenue product of work groups that are comparable
across jobs and across firms. Such data are not available. It is assumed that PrWj summed
over a worker's life cycle is uncorrelated with schooling and GIA (ie. that ~=Q).8 The paper
focuses its analysis on the second and third terms of the identity (7).
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Analysis of GATB Validation Studies
Data on the relative productivity of a large and reasonably representative sample of
workers is available from the US Employment Service's program for revalidating the General
Aptitude Test Battery (GATB). This data set contains data on job performance, the 9 GATB
"aptitudes" and background data on 36,614 individuals in 159 different detailed occupations
defined by a unique 9-digit Dictionary of Occupational Titles code number. Professional,
managerial and high level sales occupations were not studied but the sample is quite
representative of the rest of the occupational distribution. It ranges from drafters and
laboratory testers to hotel clerks and knitting-machine operatOrs. A total of 3052 employers
participated. Since a major purpose of these validation studies was to examine the effects of
race and ethnicity on the validity of the aptitude test battery, the firms that were selected
tended to have an integrated workforce in that occupation. Firms that used aptitude tests
similar to the GATB for selecting new hires for the job being studied were excluded. The
employment service officials who conducted these studies report that this last requirement did
not result in the exclusion of many firms.
Each worker took the GATB test battery and supplied information on their age,
education, plant experience and total experience. Plant experience was defined as months
working in that occupation for the current employer. Total experience was defined as months
working in the occupation for all employers. The dependent variable for this study is a sum
of two separate administrations (generally two weeks apart) of the Standard Descriptive Rating
Scale. This rating scale (available from the author), obtains supervisory ratings of 5 aspects
of job performance (quantity, quality, accuracy, job knowledge and job versatility) as well as
an "all around" performance rating. Some studies employed rating scales specifically designed
for that occupation and in one case a work sample was one of the job performance measures.
None of the studies used ticket earnings from a piece rate pay system as the criterion.
Studies which used course grades or tests of job knowledge as a criterion were excluded.
Firms with only one employee in the job classification were excluded, as were individuals
whose reported work experience was inconsistent with their age.
Academic achievement is proxied by two GATB composites, G and N.9 General
Intellectual Achievement (G) is an average of normalized scores on a vocabulary test, an
arithmetic reasoning test and a 3-dimensional spatial relations test. The mathematical
achievement index (N) is an average of normalized .scores on the same arithmetic reasoning
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test and on a numerical computations test. Both were put into a Population SD metric by
dividing by 20.
Our objective is to explain variations in petfonnance across workers doing the same
job at the same finn. Because wage rates, average productivity levels and the standards used
to rate employees vary from plant to plant, mean differences in ratings across establishments
were assumed to have no meaning. Only deviations from the mean for the establishment were
analyzed. The variance of the job petfonnance distribution was also standardized across
establishments by dividing (RmjrRm)by the standard deviation of petfonnance calculated for
that finn (or 3 if the sample SD is less than 3).10 The model fitted to the data was the
following:
(11) Rmj~mj
= Rjj-Rj = eo + elGIAjj + eZsij + 83Xjj+ VI
SD(Rmj)
where GIAjj, Sjj are the GIA and schooling of the individual and Xjj is a vector of individual
characteristics which includes gender, Black, Hispanic, age, plant experience, total occupational
experience and their squares. Descriptive statistics are available in appendix A.
Table 2 presents estimates of equation 11 that were estimated in the full data set. The
GATB achievement tests are clearly strongly correlated with relative job petfonnance. Adding
controls for race, gender, schooling, age, plant experience, total occupational experience and
their squares does not significantly reduce the magnitude of this relationship. In model 3 a
one population standard deviation test score differential on both tests results in a relative job
petfonnance differential of 16.9 percent of a SD(R), a within finn standard deviation of the
job petfonnance rating. [Note that the GIA gap between adults with 9 and 14 years of
schooling is approximately one population standard deviation.] In contrast, schooling has a
significant negative direct effect on relative job petfonnance when measures of actual
achievement are controlled. If they do not result in higher test scores, four additional years
of schooling appear to reduce relative job petfonnance by 9.6 percent of an SD(R). The
negative effect of schooling together with the large positive effects of measured academic
achievement is strong confinnation of the empirical relevance of signaling and implicit
contracts theory.
These results, however, do nill support Ivar Berg's (1970) claim that educated workers are
systematically overpaid. Workers with high amounts of schooling are not reported by their
supervisors to be less productive than others in their job. When G and N are not included
in the model, schooling no longer has a negative effect on relative job petfonnance. When
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equation 11 is estimated in the full sample, the coefficient on schooling is .006 (t=1.97) if
schooling is entered alone and .011 (t=3.60) if gender, race, Hispanic, age, plant experience
and occupational experience are controlled but test scores are not. When equation 1 is
estimated under an assumption of employer specific fixed effects, the coefficient on schooling
is .009 (t=2.48) if schooling is entered alone and .029 (t=7.79) if gender, race, Hispanic, age,
plant experience and occupational experience are controlled but test scores are not.
Willis and Rosen found that academic achievement measured while the individual was in
the armed forces had a larger impact on the wages of those with some college education than
those who did not go to college. This interaction was tested by interacting the deviation of
G from its mean with a dummy for more than 12 years of schooling. The results presented
in row 4 of Table 2 reveal that academic achievement's effect on productivity is larger for
college educated workers than for those with 12 or fewer years of schooling. A one
population standard deviation achievement differential on both G and N raises a college
educated worker's productivity by .205 SD(R)'s and a noncollege educated worker's
productivity by .152 SD(R)'s.
It is well documented that the earnings payoff to academic achievement tends to grow with
age (Hauser and Daymont 1977; Taubman and Wales 1974). One explanation of this pattern
is that academic achievers tend to take jobs that offer a greater amount of on-the-job training
and/or receive higher rates of return on their on-the-job training. A second explanation of the
pattern is that employers may be better informed of the productivity of older workers.
Promotions and turnover would have had more time to son the older individual into a job in
which wage truly equaled marginal product. An extreme version of this second scenario
predicts that academic achievers should after a time have been promoted into a job in which
they are no longer perform better than the average for that job.
This hypothesis was tested in our data by specifying interactions between age and G,
between total occupational experience and G, between plant experience (tenure) and G and
between plant experience and years of schooling. It was hypothesized that coefficients on the
G interactions would be negative. When all four interactions were entered simultaneously, all
were statistically insignificant. The tenure-G interaction had the largest negative coefficient
so the model was reestimated with only the tenure-G interaction. The tenure-G interaction
was equal to G deviated from its mean multiplied by a dummy for tenure greater than 59
months (the approximate mean for the sample). Results are reponed in row 5 of Table 5.
The coefficient on the tenure-G interaction is negative and significant at the 5 percent level.
15
This implies that there is some tendency for the discrepancies between productivity and wage
rates that are correlated with G to be greater early in a worker's tenure at a firm. Presumably
promotions and selective attrition sort academic achievers into better jobs in which they are
somewhat less likely to be substantially more productive than their peers. However, the
magnitude of the interaction effect is quite small. The effect of G and math achievement on
the relative productivity of those with more than 5 years of tenure is only about 15 percent
less than G and math achievement's effect on those with fewer than 5 years of tenure.
Consequently, the extreme version of scenario 2 is not supported by the data. This suggests
that greater access to OJT and higher rates of return on OJT investments are part of the
reason why the earnings payoff to academic achievement increases with age.
Academic achievement helps a worker learn new and complicated jobs faster and more
thoroughly. It should, therefore, raise the productivity of on-the-job training. Large
companies typically offer more training than small companies (Bishop 1982), so it is
hypothesized that GIA will have a larger effect on relative productivity at larger companies.
To test this hypothesis an interaction variable was defined by multiplying G by the log of one
plus the number of individuals in the occupation at the establishment divided by 10. The
results of including this interaction are presented in row 6 of Table 5. The coefficient on the
interaction variable is highly significant, so the hypothesis is supported. But the magnitude
of the interaction effect is quite modest. A one POPSD increase in both G and N raises
relative productivity by .158 SD(R) if the company has only 9 people in the job and by .174
SD(R) if the company has 100 people in the job.
Interactions with occupation were tested by estimating separate models for 5 major
categories of occupations: technicians, clerical, high skill blue collar, low skill blue collar and
service workers. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 3. Mean levels of
academic achievement vary greatly across occupations. In column 6 of the table we see that
the test scores of low skill blue collar workers and service workers are about 60 percent of
a standard deviation below those of technicians, clerical workers and high skill blue collar
workers. The results reported in column 1 and 2 of the table demonstrate that academic
achievement has substantial effects on job performance in all occupational categories even
those requiring the least skill. The partial correlation of schooling with job performance was
significantly negative in all of the blue collar occupations, non significantly negative for
clerical workers and essentially zero for technicians. This suggests that the tendency to over
reward credentials may be confined to blue collar jobs.
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It is often claimed that once some minimum level of academic achievement is reached,
higher levels of achievement make no funher contribution to job performance. This
hypothesis was tested by adding the square of G to the models presented in Tables 2 and 3.
The hypothesis was rejected. Only 1 of the 6 coefficients was negative. None of the
coefficients were statistically significant at even the .20 level on a two tail test.
The true relationship between academic achievement and productivity is in fact stronger
than the results reponed above, for they have been attenuated by measurement error. The
alternate form reliability for GIA and math achievement are .875 and .845 respectively
(Department of Labor, 1970). Measurement error in schooling has a variance of about 1.0
(Bishop 1976; Jencks et al 1979). The upper bound on the reliability of job performance
measures like the Standard Descriptive Rating Scale has been found to be .6 (King, Hunter
and Schmidt, 1980). Therefore, the following measurement model was appended to equation
11.
G. = GIA + V2IJ IJ
12) N.. = GIA.. + V' 2lJ lJ
YRED.. = S.. + V3Y IJ
x. = Xl.. + V4IJ 1J
13) R;r~ = rpp\j + Vs = rp[(P\-P~)!SD(P)] + Vs
where except for r(v2,v'2) 0; VI' v2, v' 2, v3, V4and Vsare uncorrelated, rp is the reliability of
the job performance measure, (PirPj) is the deviation of "i"s true productivity in dollars from
the mean for that job and )Cjj is a vector of the true values of individual characteristics like
gender, ethnicity, age, tenure and occupational experience. For independent variables, the
measurement model makes the standard assumption that measurement errors are uncorrelated
with the true values of the variables, with each other and with equation error. 11 The
measurement model for productivity is the standard model employed by industrial
psychologists. It assumes that the rating of relative job performance, (RirRj), is a cardinal
measure of productivity and that its relationship with true productivity is linear. The metrics
of Rij-Rj and of p\j have been chosen to give them a mean of zero and unit variance.
The LISREL program was employed to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the full
system of equations. Estimates of the coefficients for GIA and schooling are presented in line
7 of Table 2. Taking into account measurement error greatly increases the estimated negative
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effect of schooling. Controlling on achievement, an additional year of schooling is associated
with a reduction in relative productivity of .079 SD(pt). The direct effects of academic
achievement on productivity were large before correcting for measurement error; now they are
double their previous level. A one population standard deviation increase in GIA results in
a .321 SD(pt) improvement in true job performance. Except for the different metric of the
dependent variable, these effect estimates are intended to be comparable to structural
coefficients from wage equations estimated in representative samples of the full population.
If the 159 detailed DOT occupations studied had been a random sample of 34,000 detailed
occupations in the economy [and the firms randomly selected as well], these coefficients
would have been free from selection bias. Unfortunately, however, professional, managerial
and high level sales jobs are not included in the data set so the results may be subject to
selection bias. Adding these occupations to the data base might make the coefficient on
schooling less negative. Since, however, estimations of equation 1 with job-specific fixed
effects find that GIA's validity in predicting job performance is greater in the more cognitively
demanding occupations, the positive effect of GIA on relative productivity might become even
larger if these higher level occupations had been included.
Calculations of the Effect of GIA on Relative Productivity in Dollars
Up to this point the effect of GIA and schooling on job performance ratings and on true
productivity have been reported in standard deviation units not in dollars or percentages.
While the findings that GIA is underrewarded and that schooling is overrewarded (if GIA has
not improved) do not depend on such a translation, the substantive importance of these
findings depends on the implied dollar magnitudes so it would be useful to have an estimate
of their magnitUde. As Brogden (1949) points out, this can be achieved by multiplying the
estimated effect of a variable on true productivity in standard deviation units by an estimate
of the standard deviation of true productivity across workers, SD(Pj), obtained from another
source. Most of the studies of the variability of output across workers, SD$, summarized in
Table 1 were efforts to obtain estimates of SD(Pj) (a more complete description of the studies
is provided in Appendix A which is available from the author). The industrial psychology
literature contains numerous studies estimating the utility (in dollars) of methods of selecting
new hires and other personnel policies using the approach suggested by Brogden. These
studies assume that SD$ = SD(P), so this is the assumption employed in the calculations
below. 12
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For the occupations included in the GATB revalidation data base the weighted average
SD$ is $10850 or 43.6 percent of mean compensation in these occupations.13 Multiplying
these values by -.079, the estimated effect of a year of schooling on p\j' the implied effect of
a year of schooling (holding GIA constant) on relative productivity in dollars is to reduce it
by $857 or 3.4 percent of compensation in these occupations. The effect of a POPSD of
GIA on relative productivity is quite large--$3483 or 14.0 percent of compensation in these
occupations. When similar corrections for measurement error are made, the effect of GIA on
the logarithm of weekly earnings with schooling controlled is only slightly larger: 19 percent
per Population SD (Bishop 1989).
An information externality is implied, however, only if within job relative wages do not
respond to academic achievement in a like manner. The next section of the paper examines
the extent to which relative wages of individuals doing the same job depend on productivity
or academic achievement.
VI. The Effects of Academic Achievement
on Within-Job Relative Wa&es.
This section of the paper examines the determinants of within-job relative wage rates, Wir
Wj. Probably the most imponant single determinant of within job relative wage rates is
tenure. In many jobs tenure is the only source of pay differentials. In 52 percent of plant
jobs and 14 percent of office jobs at establishments with more than 50 employees, wage rates
either do not vary or vary only with tenure.(Cox 1971) This implies that at these
establishments there is a tendency to underreward academic achievement.
What about the remainder of establishments which set pay individually, or use merit pay
plans with individual incentives? Wages and academic achievement might be positively
associated at these establishments. We would expect some association because employers
know the schooling of their employees and tend to make higher wage offers to those with
greater schooling. Analysis of the NCRVE employer survey (a data set which lacks test score
measures) using models with job specific fixed effects found that wage rates are significantly
higher for those with greater schooling even when one is comparing two workers doing the
same or a very similar job. Each additional year of schooling was associated with wage rates
being 1.1 percent higher (t=2.87) at the start and 1.2 percent higher (t=2.23) at the end of a
year (Bishop 1987). Regressions predicting a ratio scale measure of reponed productivity in
this same data set find that years of schooling had no effect on initial productivity but that
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after one year at the finn, each additional year of schooling was associated with about 1
percent higher productivity (Bishop, et. al. 1985). We know, however, from the analysis of
GATB data that the correlation between schooling and productivity relative to one's coworkers
arises from their common association with GIA and math achievement.
For college graduates there is still another way in which educational achievements may be
credentialed--the reputation of the college and the GPA achieved at this school. In the NFIB
survey, college transcripts had been obtained for 26 percent of the college graduates hired.
David Wise (1975) found that college selectivity and GPA had a significant effect on
promotions and wage increases of professional and managerial employees at Ford Motor
Company. Bretz's (1989) meta analysis found a significant positive association between rates
of salary growth and college GPA.
These findings on the effects of schooling, college GPA and college selectivity confinn
that credentials signaling academic achievement are rewarded. However, correlations between
years of schooling, GPA and scores on GIA tests are not all that high. In Project Talent data,
for example, scores on achievement tests taken in high school correlated only .38 with high
school grades (Jencks and Crouse 1982). The correlation between schooling and adult test
scores is .42 in the GATB data, .473 in the PSID and .7 in IQ standardization samples (Jencks
et al 1979; Matarazzo 1972). Consequently, these findings leave open the question of whether
academic achievement not signaled by a credential is rewarded. In order for this to occur the
finn would have to base wage offers on either a test score or on job perfonnance. The
employers in the GATB validation studies had not administered tests to their employees, so
wages could not have been based on test scores.14
Firms do base wage decisions on job perfonnance but the magnitude of the wage response
is small compared to the magnitude of the productivity differentials that arise between people
doing the same job. CPS surveys reveal that only 1.2 percent are paid on a piece rate basis
and only 1.9 percent are paid on a pure commission basis (Flaim 1979). Analysis of the
NCRVE employer survey found that the elasticity of starting wage rates with respect to the
ratio scale measure of relative productivity was .08 or less and that after one year on the job
this elasticity had risen no higher than .22 (Bishop 1987).
In Medoff and Abraham's data current job perfonnance ratings have only small effects on
the current wage rate of senior professional and managerial workers when job classification
is held constant. A one standard deviation improvement in a worker's rated perfonnance
raised wage rates by 1.9 percent at company A, by 1.2 percent at company B and by 3.5
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percent at Company C (Medoff and Abraham 1980a, 1980b). After a rough correction for
measurement error in job performance, these estimates become 3.2, 2.0 and 5.8 percent
respectively.15
The ratio of SD$ to mean compensation in technical and administrative occupations is
approximately one half. Making the assumption that is conventional in the industrial
psychology literature that SD$=SD(P~), the share of a productivity differential that accrues to
the worker in higher wages can be calculated by dividing the percentage wage differential
resulting from a one SD performance differential by 50 percent. This share appears to be
under 15 percent in the Medoff/Abraham data.
The response of wages to multiyear averages of relative productivity levels is likely to be
higher. A study by Gerhart and Milkovich (1987) of professional and managerial workers in
a large diversified manufacturing firm found that while a one SD differential in 1980
performance ratings was associated with only a 2.8 percent differential in 1980 wages,
consistently high ratings generated larger wage increases and a more rapid climb up the
firms's job heirarchy. A one SD differential in average ratings during the 1980 to 1986
period resulted in a 5.6 percent larger wage increase over the 6 year interval. Nevertheless,
the increment in average earnings over the course of the six year period appears to be only
about 18 percent of a true productivity increment during those 6 years. [Note that in many
cases the increased wages are the result of promotions into higher job categories.] If we
assume a 4 percent yearly risk of permanent separation and a 6 percent real discount rate, the
present value of the lifetime earnings gain from a one SD differential in true performance in
a given year is about 15.5 percent of one year's compensation. This calculation would seem
to imply that even in the long run only about 30 percent of the unanticipated ex post
productivity contributions of a worker at this firm accrued to the worker in higher lifetime
earnings.16
It is, therefore, fair to conclude that the personal rewards for academic achievement arise
primarily from obtaining or being promoted into better jobs, not from being paid more in a
given job. This is especially true in the clerical and blue collar jobs that predominate in the
GATB validation data set. In blue collar and clerical occupations, measures of academic
achievement such as test scores and GPA have almost no effect on wage rates when schooling
is controlled. Taubman and Wales' (1974) analysis of NBER Thorndike data, for instance,
found that in these occupations a one standard deviation test score differential raised earnings
by only 1.3 percent for those in their early 30's and by 1.9 percent for those in their middle
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40's. In High School and Beyond followups of those who did not go to college, correlations
between indicators of academic achievement and wage rates are negative for unskilled and
semiskilled blue collar workers of both sexes and for male clerical and retail sales workers.
For female clerical and retail sales workers the correlations are positive, but the implied effect
of academic achievement on wage rates is small.
One is forced to conclude that for these occupations academic achievement's effects on
within-job relative wage rates are significantly smaller than its effects on relative productivity
in the GATB validation data. Consequently, the effect of GIA on discrepancies between
productivity and wage rates is almost as large as its effect on productivity and, therefore, are
of significant size.
VI. Summary and Implications
While theory states that wage rates and earnings differentials are a good proxy for
differentials in marginal revenue product when different firms, jobs and occupations are being
compared, signaling and implicit contracts theory implies that no such prediction can be made
when coworkers with the same job assignment are being compared. The results presented
above establish that productivity differences between workers who do the same job and are
paid the same wage at a firm are often quite large and are correlated with academic
achievement. These results provide support for the practical significance of signaling theories
in which schooling serves as a signal for the individual's learning achievements. They also
provide support for the proposition that academic achievement of high school graduates is
underrewarded in the American labor market. The major qualifications that must be added
to this last conclusion are (a) it depends on a maintained assumption that a lifetime average
PrWj is uncorrelated with GIAjj and Sjj, (b) it is based on analysis of a data set that does not
contain the most cognitively demanding jobs and (c) estimates of the magnitude of these
effects are sensitive to the maintained assumption that SD$ = SD(ptj)' Nevertheless, these
findings have significant implications both for growth accounting, for policy analysis and for
policy.
Implications for Growth Accounting
If GIA's has larger effects on productivity than on wage rates, estimates of the social costs
of the test score decline based on the wage effects of test scores will understate the true costs.
Based on wage effects alone, Bishop (1989) calculated that the test score decline lowered GNP
in 1987 by $86 billion and that the present discounted sum of the resulting output shortfalls
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up to the year 2010 was $3.2 nillion. Let us make the conservative assumption that one-
third of the increase in relative productivity associated with higher GIA is off set by an
increase in within job relative wage rates. This then implies that the true effect of a
Population SD of GIA on the logarithm of worker quality is .2833, not the .19 used in Bishop
(1989), and that the effects of the test score decline are 50 percent greater than those
presented in Bishop (1989). This produces the following estimates of the costs of the test
score decline: (a) reductions in the growth of labor quality of .21 percent per year between
1973 and 1980 and of .36 percent per year between 1980 and 1987, (b) reductions in worker
quality of 4.35 percent in 1987 and 10 percent in 2010, (c) a $129 billion reduction in 1987
GNP and (d) output shortfalls cumulated through 2010 with a present value of $4.8 nillion.
Implications for Policy Analysis and Research
If something as easy to measure as academic achievement generates uncompensated
productivity differentials, other difficult to signal educational achievements probably have the
same effect. This implies that when educational achievements are not well signaled to
employers, standard evaluation techniques which compare the earnings of randomly assigned
treatment and control groups may yield unreliable and biased estimates of the social benefits
of the program. When followups last only a year or so, the conventional approach more
nearly measures the reputation of a program's graduates. than it measures the true impact of
the educational experience on productivity.
The correlation between reputation and reality is likely to be low for programs in operation
a short time, for programs that change frequently or have high staff turnover, for programs
serving stigmatized groups, for special programs with different entry and graduation criteria
from those prevailing elsewhere in the educational institution and for programs that have done
a particularly good or poor job of marketing their graduates.
The paper has attempted to show that evaluations of educational and training programs
need not and should not be confined to examining wage and earnings effects. This is an
essential first step but a second step is required as well. The second step involves comparing
the productivity of graduates of the program to other comparable workers in the same job who
are paid the same wage. If the second study is done well, the total social benefits of the
educational program can be obtained by adding the productivity and wage effects together
(Bishop 1989b).
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Implications for Education and Training Policies
This paper confirms one of the central predictions of signaling theory: when workers in
the same job are compared and academic achievement is controlled, schooling is negatively
correlated with a worker's relative productivity. The lack of information on achievements in
American high schools means that hiring selections and starting wage rates often do not reflect
the competencies and abilities individuals developed in school. Instead, these decisions are
based on observable characteristics such as educational credentials that in the United States
are very imperfect signals of the competencies that cannot be directly observed. If we
assume, as the industrial psychology literature appears to, that SD(Pj) equals SD$, a year of
schooling appears to be associated with reductions in relative productivity equal to 2.3 percent
(two-thirds of 3.4 percent) of compensation when GIA is held constant. Since a year in high
school raises earnings only 5 to 6 percent when family background and adult test scores are
controlled (Jencks et al. 1979), the direct effect of a year of secondary school on productivity
(that which is not mediated by test score gains) would appear to be only 3 to 4 percent. If
schooling has a positive effect on within-job wage differentials when GIA is controlled, the
direct effect of schooling is even smaller.
The results also have implications for the screening theory of education. When schooling
does not enhance productivity but only signals inherent productivity and firms need not know
who is most able to realize the benefits of highly able employees, the social benefits of
schooling are much smaller than its private rewards (Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975). If GIA's
correlation with schooling is entirely due to selection and not to learning, the measurement
model results suggest that schooling's effect on productivity is 2.3 percent per year less than
is implied by standard wage equations. It would appear there may be a problem of
"overschooling". The extent of the problem depends on the extent to which schools select for
talent rather than develop it.
Up to this point, it has not mattered whether G and N measured an inherited trait or a
competency acquired in school. Now it does. A definitive treatment of this controversial
topic is beyond the scope of this paper, but a quick review of some of the important findings
related to the issue is provided below. The consensus among psychologists is that
employment tests measure abilities, skills and habits which must be developed and which
are, therefore, malleable (Wigdor and Gardner, 1982). There appears to be considerable
evidence that scores on "aptitude" tests are significantly affected by environmental factors such
as schooling. Studies have shown that scores on academic achievement tests improve over
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the course of the school year and then decline during the summer vacation (Heyns 1987),
improve more rapidly for those in school than for drop outs (Husen 1951; Department of
Labor 1970; Hotchkiss 1984) and improve more rapidly if the student pursues a rigorous
college prep curriculum (Bishop 1985; Hotchkiss 1984). The important effects of environment
on these developed abilities is also demonstrated by the upward trend of national mean scores
on IQ tests in the United States, Japan and Europe (Tuddenham 1948; Flynn 1987), by the
large fluctuations in scores on broad spectrum achievement tests (scores of Iowa seniors on
the Iowa Test of Educational Development rose .58 standard deviations between 1942 and
1967 and then fell by .35 standard deviations between 1967 and 1979, (Bishop 1989a) and by
the rapidly closing gap between black and white achievement in National Assessment of
Educational Progress data (Koretz 1986). If as argued above, the correlation between adult
GIA and schooling reflects learning more than selection, the screening bias in estimates of
returns to schooling becomes smaller and the externalities of schooling probably outweigh any
"overschooling" effect.
Years in school is not, however, the only dimension of educational investment. The effort
exerted per year is equally as important. Consequently, an even more important implication
of signaling models (one that has been neglected by the literature) is that whenever credentials
are awarded for years in school and learning is difficult to verify by other means, the private
rewards for effort and learning will be reduced, and students will underinvest in this dimension
of their education. The distortions that result from the absence of good signals for academic
achievement appear to be very significant. A one POPSD improvement in GIA generated by
studying hard appears to increase a worker's expected productivity relative to coworkers in the
same job by $3483 or 14.0 percent of average compensation. Only a small part of this
increase in relative productivity is apparently captured by the worker in the form of higher
within-job relative wage rates.
Will achievement gains resulting from harder studying or better teaching raise wages and
relative productivity by the amounts implied by the coefficients on GIA in equation 5 or
equation 12? Those who believe that the "G" and "N" aptitudes of the GATB measure an
inherited trait might argue to the contrary that productivity is a result of on-the-job learning,
not in-school learning, and that these tests measure inherited learning ability, not outcomes of
schooling that improve job performance. In this view, G and N are good measures of
inherited learning ability because everyone receives roughly equivalent instruction in the
material covered by the test, so differences in knowledge at the end of instruction primarily
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reflect differences in inherited learning ability. This view, however, does not withstand
scrutiny.
Many of its key predictions are contradicted by data. 1) If it were true, we would expect
childhood IQ tests to predict adult labor market success just as well as adult IQ tests. In fact,
when adult IQ tests compete with childhood IQ tests, it is the adult test, not the childhood
test, which has by far the biggest effect on labor market success (Husen, 1969). (2) In
addition, we would expect less "culturally loaded" non-verbal IQ tests to be equally good
predictors of labor market success as tests of reading and writing skills. In fact, a study of
Kenyan workers has found that wages were significantly affected by literacy but not by non-
verbal IQ (Brossiere, Knight and Sabot, 1985). (3) Funhermore, we would expect education
obtained abroad in non-English speaking countries to be just as good a signal of high IQ (and
therefore just as good a predictor of wage rates in the U.S. economy) as education obtained
in the U.S. or English speaking countries. In fact, a year of schooling obtained in a non-
English speaking country has a much smaller effect on wage rates than a year of schooling
obtained in the U.S. or another English speaking country. (Chiswick, 1978). (4) Finally, we
would expect that controlling for genotype IQ (e.g. by comparing identical twins) would
reduce the effect of test scores on labor market success to zero. Since siblings are genetically
similar, we would expect IQ effects to diminish when siblings are being compared. In fact
the effect of IQ (measured while in school) on labor market success is actually greater when
brothers are compared than in standard cross section regressions (Olneck 1977).
These findings suggest that the associations between the "G" and "N" aptitudes of the
GATB and relative productivity arise primarily because the tests measure skills and
competencies that contribute to productivity and not an inherited learning ability and, therefore,
that the coefficients obtained on GIA when equations like 5 and 12 are estimated provide
reasonable estimates of the true causal impact of achievement gains that result from better
teaching or studying harder. Consequently, it would appear that signaling problems diminish
considerably the private economic payoffs to raising the quality of education and to studying
hard while in schoo1.1? Since it is even harder to signal the fine details of academic
achievement than overall achievement, signaling problems also diston the pattern of rewards
for particular types of competency (Bishop 1988).
The tendency to underreward effon and learning in secondary school may be a peculiarly
American phenomenon. Grades in school are a crucial determinant of which employer a
German youth apprentices with. European employers expect job applicants to put grades on
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the national achievement exams taken at the end of high school on their job applications and
resumes. Top companies in Japan and Europe often hire lifetime employees directly out of
secondary school. Teacher recommendations, grades and scores on national and provincial
exams have a significant impact on who is hired by the more prestigious firms (Rosenbaum
and Kariya 1987).
This helps explain why, in math and science, American students compare unfavorably to
their peers overseas (IAEEA 1988; McKnight et al 1987), and why so many observers of
American secondary education have remarked on how little energy students seem to devote
to learning. John Goodlad (1984) observed, "The extraordinary degree of student passivity
stands out." Theodore Sizer (1984) concluded, "No more imponant finding has emerged from
the inquiries of our study than the American high school student, as student, is all too often
docile, compliant and without initiative." One cause of this phenomenon may be the failure
of the economy to give academic achievement its due reward in the labor market and reward
instead credentials that signify time spent rather than competencies obtained.
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NOTES
1. Test scores appear to have larger effects on the wages of those who go to college. Willis
and Rosen found that for this population a one standard deviation increase in math and
reading test scores raised wages by 3.6 percent in the first job after school and by 8.3
percent 20 years later. One of the reasons for academic achievement's greater effect on
college graduates is the signals of academic achievement provided by the reputation of the
college one attends.
2. For tests given to high school seniors a one standard deviation academic achievement
differential is equal to 3.5 to 4 grade level equivalents «GLE). We assume that range
restriction reduced the variance of the test by a factor of 3 and that test retest reliability
is .85. Then, 0y/aGLE
=
.035( 3)/.85(3.5) = .02.
3. Ironically the court decision which sustained EEOC's power in this area (Griggs vs. Duke
Power 40IUS424-1971) struck down the use of high school diplomas as a screening
criterion for an entry level job. However, if schooling is not removed from the job
application, there is no way of enforcing a ban against using schooling as a hiring
criterion. Tests must be administered before they can be used, so EEOC has been much
more successful in restricting their use. Griggs may also have been part of the reason why
employers do not insist that youthful job applicants bring high school transcripts when they
apply for a job and have not complained more forcefully when local high schools do not
respond to student requests that transcripts be sent to the employer.
4. If employers use pay to motivate workers and are not constrained by worker risk aversion,
the optimal C1would be very close to 1. Since the V(e) is substantial this would imply
that the variance of wages would have to exceed the variance of weighted averages of past
productivity. Since relative productivity has been found to have only moderate effects on
relative wages (Bishop 1987), it appears that worker risk aversion, union aversion to
unconstrained merit payor some other factor is resulting in employment contracts which
recognize individual performance only in pan.
5. The literature search began with two recent reviews of the industrial psychology literature
on the subject (Schmidt and Hunter 1983 and Boudreau 1986). A number of other studies
were tracked down through leads provided by John Hunter and by John Boudreau.
6. The job incumbents used to calculate these raw validity estimates have been through two
different selection processes--first hiring and then retention--so these raw validity numbers
are not estimates of population validities. For our purposes, however, raw validity
estimates are what is required. They characterize how the conditional expectations of
relative productivity vary with a worker's characteristics in a sample of job incumbents.
7. An alternative way of estimating the bias in the wage equation would be to apply a job
specific fixed effects methodology to equation 1 and then compare the results to wage
equations estimated in other data sets. This approach was rejected for 4 reasons: (a) it is
hostage to the accuracy of our estimates of SD$ and SD(Pj), (b) the crucial hypothesis
tests necessitate a comparison of parameters estimated in very disparate data sets, (c) it
depends on an assumption--the average quality of a workforce has the same effect on
average productivity as deviations of worker quality from the average have on deviations
of productivity from the average--which is almost cenainly wrong and (d) the selection bias
problem.
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8. Theory suggests a number of factors which could cause Pr Wj to be non zero: adjustment
costs, monopsony power, agency problems, and specific human capital. If the firm were
in disequilibrium due to a cyclical downturn, the size of the quasi rents would vary across
jobs and their magnitude would probably be correlated with a worker's schooling or GIA.
Specific human capital investments and monitoring costs are also both likely to be greater
in the types of jobs that workers with high levels of schooling and GIA obtain. In all
three cases, the time paths of productivity and wages that result have counter balancing
periods of over and under compensation. Consequently, from a long run life cycle
perspective, these quasi rents should net out to zero. Monopsony power and bargaining
over the division of the firm's quasi rents, on the other hand, might generate non zero
lifetime PrW/s. Bishop (1978) examined the effect of queuing for union jobs on the
social return to schooling and found that the lowered probability of taking union jobs that
results from going to college raises the social return to college above the private return.
The effect of queuing for union jobs on the social return to GIA was not investigated.
An exploration of this and related issues is beyond the scope of this paper. It is an area
that could benefit from more research.
9. Industrial psychologists generally refer to these tests as aptitude tests because from the
employer's perspective they measure aptitudes that contribute to job performance. The
paper refers to them as achievement tests because it takes the perspective of the
educational system. While there is some controversy about how large schooling's effect
is, there is no controversy about the proposition that additional schooling does improve test
scores on all types of tests including those referred to as IQ and Aptitude tests (Lorge
1945; Husen 1951; Department of Labor 1970). Further evidence of the great sensitivity
of IQ and other "aptitude" tests to environment comes from the fact that the IQ of young
adults has been rising rapidly in Europe and Japan and until recently was rising rapidly
in the US as well (Bishop 1987b; Flynn 1987).
10. The formula was SD(Rm) = (Rm;rRml/N-l. Occasionally employers who had only 2 or
3 employees gave them all the same rating. Consequently, a lower bound of 40 percent
of the mean SD(Rm.) was placed on the value the SD could take. Models were also
estimated which did not standardize job performance variance across firms and which
instead standardized the variances only across the occupation. None of the substantive
findings were changed by this alternative methodology.
11. The variance of the measurement error of schooling, .94, was at the lower end of the range
reported by Bishop (1974) and Jencks et. al (1979). G and N were assumed to be
indicators of the unobservable GIA. With G and N each assigned a POPSD of 1.0, the
variance of their measurement error was .125 and .155 respectively. Since the arithmetic
operations test was a component of both G and N, the covariance of V2 and V'2 was
assumed to be .06125. Gender, Black and Hispanic were assumed to be measured without
error. Reliability was assumed to be .9 for age, age squared, occupational experience and
occupational experience squared and .95 for tenure and tenure squared. The correlation
between the measurement errors of a variable and its square was assumed to be equal to
the correlation between the underlying variable. The estimated coefficient on schooling
and GIA were not sensitive to estimation technique (OLS or maximum likelihood) or to
assumptions regarding measurement error in the control variables (gender, black, Hispanic,
age, tenure and occupational experience). The measurement assumptions that make a
difference are those that relate to the reliability of schooling, GIA and the job performance
measure.
12. The industrial psychology literature contains a good deal of discussion of the proper
method for measuring SD$ and SD(P) (Boudreau 1986, Schmidt and Hunter 1983).
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Reasonable arguments can be developed for current estimates of SD(Pj) being both too
large and too small. More research is needed on this issue.
13. The estimate of SD$ for specific occupations were taken from Table 1. The ratio of the
earnings of the jobs in the GATB data to the earnings of all jobs was calculated from
Table 281 of the 1980 Census. The weights were .08 for technician, .224 for clerical
workers, .027 for plant operators, .324 for craft workers, .281 for semi skilled blue collar
workers and .065 for other service workers. The National Income Accounts provided the
$25,289 estimate of average compensation per full time equivalent employee.
14. The fact that very few firms had to be excluded from the study because they were using
tests during the 1972 - 1982 period indicates that most employers had no access to the
GIA scores of their employees. Employers might, however, have other less formal
mechanisms of assessing GIA and might base pay decisions on these assessments. This
hypothesis cannot be tested here because none of the data sets available contain measures
of both GIA and within-job relative wages. Research into this issue is needed. However,
the effect of GIA on within-occupation relative wage rates was studied and results for blue
collar and clerical occupations are presented below.
15. Medoff and Abraham report regressions in which salary is predicted by education,
experience, grade level dummies and dummies for performance rating (Table 1 and II
1980a and Table 1 1980b). It was assumed that the underlying distribution of job
performance was normal. The mean Z scores were calculated for the top rating category
(4) and for the two lowest rating categories combined (ZI)' The wage effect of a one SD
performance differential was calculated by the formula (bt - bl)/(4 -ZI) where bl is a
weighted average of the coefficients on the two low rating categories. Rough adjustments
for measurement error were made by dividing these estimates by .6, the reliability of the
rating scale.
16. Gerhan and Milkovich (1987) enter the performance rating linearly into log salary level
and log salary growth regressions. The standard deviation of this variable is .56 in 1980
and .54 in 1986. The coefficient on the 6 year average rating (which has an SD of .37)
was .1035. A one SD (.55) increase in rating for one year raises ones Ii f e t i m e
salary level by .00949. [.1035 x .55 /6]. A rough correction for measurement error was
made by dividing .00949 by .6, the reliability of the rating scale. Assuming an infinite
lifetime and a discounting factor of 10 percent, the present discounted value of a permanent
1.55 percent wage increase is 15.5 percent of compensation for one year.
17. One potential challenge to this conclusion comes from the possibility that these
discrepancies reflect a tendency to reward academic achievement in invisible ways such
as praise, perks and higher social status rather than through more visible mechanisms such
as wage increases and promotions (Frank 1984). If these rewards were large and
anticipated by students when deciding about the effort to apply to their studies, there might
be no tendency for students to underinvest in learning. This might be pan of the story
but it cannot be the whole story. The reason for this conclusion is that workers are risk
averse and relative productivity cannot be measured with perfect reliability. These two
facts will result in under compensation of real improvements in productivity even if the
compensation comes in a form that is invisible to the analyst.
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Transportation Equipment .16 5.1
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Protective Occupations .23 .27 0.0
Other Service .26 .27 .17 $ 4,068 13.4
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'T'able 1
GENERAL INTELLECTUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY ON THE JOB
1The raw validity estimates for professional, technical, administrative protective
occupations and other service workers are averages of studies reported in the GATE
manual. The estimate for clerical workers is from Pearlman, Schmidt and Hunter
(1980). The estimate for sales except retail and service is based on Churchill
et al's (1985) examination of 44 studies using objective company data with controls
for environmental conditions. The estimate for plant operators is an average of
results from Dunette et al (1984, Table 5.38) and from Schmidt, Hunter and Caplan,
1983, Table 4.
2The estimates of SD of output are from the review of the 34 studies presented in
tables 1, 2 and 3.
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Effects of Academic Achievement on Relative Job Performance
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Source: Analysis of 31399 observations from US Employment Service Individual Observation Data File.
The metric of GIA and Mathematical Achievement is a POP So. The metric of Job Performance is within
firm standard deviation of the performance rating scale. Productivity relative to coworkers is modeled
as a function of background characteristics. Models 1-6 do not correct for errors in measurement and
are thus estimates of equation 8. Model 7 is a maximum likelihood estimate of the measurement model-
- equations 11, 12 and 13. The estimated value of X was 1.029 with a standard error of .003.
Table 3
Equation 8
Effects of Academic Achievement on Job Performance
by Occupation
General Years GIA Effect of a
Occupational Intellectual Mathematical of (Pop. POP SD of GIA & M
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Technicians .101 .098 .004 .07& 2384 .081 .299
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The metric of GIA and Math Achievement is a population SD.
The metric of Job Performance is the within firm standard deviation of the performance rating scale.
Productivity relative to coworkers is modeled as a function of background characteristics.
Controls were included for gender, black, hispanic, age, tenure and total occupational experience and their squares.
Errors in measurement of job performance, GIA and Years of Schooling have not been adjusted for.
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0
0 4. Performance is usually superior in quality.
0 $. Performance is almost alw.ys or the hishest quality.
J. Performance is inferior and almost never meets minimum quality standards.
3. Performance is .cceptable but usually not superior in quality.
c. How .ccurale is tbe work? (Worlcer's .bility to .void makina mistakes.)
0
0 2. Makes Crequenl mistakes. Work needs more checleina than is dewable.
D 3. Makesmistakesoccasionally. Workneeds only normal checkin..
0 4. Makes few mistakes. Work 8eldom needs chec1tina.
[J S. Rarely makes. mistake. Work almost never needs checkina.
J. Makes vcry many mistakes. Work needs constant cheddna.
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D. How much does the worbr know about the job~ (Worhr's underatlndinl of the prindples, equipment, materials
8'Id mtthoeSs that hlYe to do directly or indirectl)' with the work.) .
a I. Has WI)' limited knowle.. DoesDotknow enou&f1to do the job 8dequately.
a 2.Has tittle bowledae. Knowsenou&f1to act by.
a 3. Has moderate amount of bowled.. Knowsenou&f1to do fair work.
a 4. Has broad bowled,e. Knowsenou&f1to do JOoeSwork.
a S.Has complete bowie.. Knowsthejob thoroulhJ)'.
. .
E. How larae a wriet)' of job duties can the worker perform efrlCientl)'~ (Worker's ability to handle ItYerai different
operltionJ.)
a
a 2. Can perform a limited nwnber of difTerent operations efficiently.
a 3. Can perform ItYerai different operations with reasonable efficiency.
a 4. Can perform many different operations efficiently.
0 S. Can perform In unusuall)' Jarae variety of different operations efficiently.
I. Cannot perform different operations adequately.
F. Considerin, all the factors already rated, and only these factors, how lood is this worker~ (Worker's aD_ounel
,
abilit)' to do the job.)
[:) I. Performanceusually not acceptable.
0 2. Performancesomewhatinferior.
(] 3. A fairly proficient worker.
(] 4. Performanceusually IUperior.
[:) S. An unusuallycompetent worker.
Complete the roDowin, ONt Y if the worker is no lon,er on the job.
G. What do you think is the reason this perlOn left the job? (It is not neCtUlI)' to show the official reason if you
leel that there is another reason, u this form will not be shown to InYbody in the complnY.)
0 I. Fired becauseof inability to do the job.
[:) 2. Quit, and I feel that it wu becaUItof dirrlCUltydoinl the job.
0 3. Fired or laid off for rellOnsother than abilit)' to do the job (i.e., absenteeism,reduction in lorce).
0 4. Ouit, and I reel the felSon ror quittinl wu not related to abilit)' to do the job.
a s.Quit or wu promoted or reassianedbeQlUItthe worbr had leamtd the job weDand wanttd to 8dvance.
.
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APPENDIX B
STUDIES OF OUTPUT VARIABILITY
A search for studies of output variability yielded 49 published and
8 unpublished papers covering 94 distinct jobs.6 Their results are reported
in tables 1 through 4. Table 1 summarizes the studies of output variability
among semiskilled factory workers. The jobs known to be paid on a piece
rate basis are not included in the table. Schmidt and Hunter (1983) found
that such jobs typically have smaller coefficients of variation. Apparently
when workers are paid on a piece rate basis, quit rates are more responsive
to productivity than when pay is on an hourly basis. The less productive
workers self select themselves out of such jobs and the surviving job
incumbents become more and more similar in their output.
Estimates of productivity standard deviations (SD$) in 1985 dollars are
reported in column 2 of the tables. In most cases the author of the study
made no attempt to estimate SD$'s, so the estimate has been calculated from
the CV. Such estimates are placed in a parenthesis. The estimates of SD$
were derived as a product of the CV, the mean compensation for that job and
the ratio of value added to compensation for that industry. This ratio is
1.52 for private non-farm business excluding mining, trade, finance and real
estate. The value added to compensation ratio in retailing and in real estate
was much too high to be used as an adjustment factor. So for all sales
occupations it was assumed that SD$ = CV times average compensation. The
SD$ of semiskilled factory jobs ranged from $1732 to $7811 and averaged $5062
for jobs not known to be paid on a piece rate.
Table 2 reports managerial estimates of coefficients of variation and
productivity SD$'s for plant operators and a number of craft occupations.
For craft occupations other than plant operators, the average CV is 27.6
percent and the average SD$ is $12,399. These are smaller than for plant
operators and larger than those for semi-skilled factory workers. Within
the ranks of blue collar workers there is a clear tendency for coefficients
of variation and standard deviations of output to rise with the complexity
and wage rate of the job.
Output variability is also great in professional and high level
managerial occupations. Users of communication satellites, for example,
are going to save billions of dollars as a result of a discovery by a
scientist at Comsat which has doubled the effective lifetime of satellites.
Exxon had invested a billion dollars in its shale oil operation at Parachute
Creek before giving up on the enterprise. A wiser CEO or better staff work
might have avoided or reduced this loss. It does not take many such examples
to produce a very large standard deviation of output for professional and
high level managerial jobs. In most white collar jobs, however, output
variability across incumbents is much smaller.
Table 3 reports the results of studies of output variability in clerical
occupations. In many of these studies hard measures of output (e.g., cards
punched) were the basis for calculating coefficients of variation.
Table 4 contains estimates of CVs and standard deviations of output
for the remainder of the occupational distribution: managerial, technical,
sales service personnel. For sales personnel the CVs are based on hard data,
distributions of actual sales. The variability of output in sales occupations
is clearly higher than in most other occupations and the variability appears
to rise with the complexity of the product that is being sold and the amount
of initiative required to sell large amounts of the product. For high level
sales personnel working in finance and manufacturing many of them paid on
a commission basis, the coefficient of variation is 62.8 percent while for
sales clerks it is 29.8 percent. When multiplied by mean levels of
compensation for full time workers in these occupations, these CVs translate
into output standard deviations of $15000 and $5228.
For most of the managerial and technical jobs studied physical measures
of output were not definable so the supervisors were asked to report dollar
amounts of output expected from workers at the 15th, 50th and 85th percentiles
of the job performance distribution. Coefficients of variation averaged
36 percent for technicians implying an output standard deviation of $13668.
The coefficient of variation was 33 percent for low level managers and 20.6
percent in the only three service occupations for which data is available.
It was felt that these three jobs represented too small a sample to produce
reliable estimates of the CV for all service jobs except police and fire
fighting so the estimate of the service CV employed in the rest of the paper
is an unweighted average of the CVs for operatives, low skill clerical workers
and 20.6, the average for the three service jobs for which there is data
on the variability of output. While the standard deviation of output appears
to be substantial (about $4000) in full time full year service jobs, there
is clearly a positive correlation between average wage levels and SD$'S.
PO -
WS -
GS -
SHMM -
S(m) -
S(T)-
SE -
SeD) -
Methods used to Estimate the Coefficient of
Variation and Standard Deviations of Output
Physical Output - Where a piece rate prevails, ticket earnings are
used as the output measure. Where pay is hourly, physical quantity
of output or percent of standard output for the job is used as the
output measure. CV's are calculated from this data and SD$s are
constructed by using value added per employee (adjusted for relative
wage rates) to value the productivity of the average worker.
Work Sample - A sample of the job tasks is taken and workers are
observed performing these tasks under controlled conditions. To
be useful for calculating a CV, the WS must be defined in units that
have a ratio scale that corresponds to output such as 50 lb sacks
carried from A to B. It measures peak performance and thus probably
does not measure effort as actually applied to a real job. SD$s
are calculated from CV's in same way they are calculated from PO
based CV's.
Gross Sales - CV's are the SD of sales across sales personnel divided
by the mean level of sales. SD$ equals the CV times the mean
compensation of sales personnel. GS(A) is calculated using a weighted
average of the sales of different products.
Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie and Muldrow (1979) Method. Managers who
supervise job incumbents are asked to place monetary values on the
output produced by an employee at the 15th, 50th and 85th percentile
of the job performance distribution. The metric in which they are
asked to make these judgement is the cost to have an "outside firms
provide these products and services." This yields direct estimates
of SD$ and a rough estimate of the CV can be calculated from (Pas -
P~s)/2Pso.
Schmidt et al (1979) method with supervisors making their judgments
after being supplied a mean output derived from company records.
Schmidt et al (1979) method with outliers dropped from the
calculation.
Supervisor's estimate for actual employees. Supervisors give dollar
values for the productivity of a sample of actual employees. The
mean and standard deviation is calculated from this distribution.
Schmidt et al (1979) method as modified by Dunnette et al (1982).
A first round of workshops with supervisors identified examples of
unusually effective, unusually ineffective and average levels of
job performance by plant operators. Eight dimensions of performance
were developed from these examples and supervisors were asked to
retranslate and scale the 667 performance examples in a second round
of workshops. Finally participants were asked to estimate dollar
value of performance at the 85th, 50th and 15th percentile. Negative
values were changed to zero.
TABLE 1
UNSKILLED AND SEMISKILLED BLUE COLLAR WORKERS
C.V. Standard
of Deviation
Output in 1985 Sample
(Incumb) Dollars" Method Size Source
Hourly or Weekly Pay
Butter Wrappers 18.4 (4129) PO 8 Rothe (1946)
Machine Operators 20.5 (6411) PO 130 Rothe (1947)
Electrical Workers 13.2 (3399) PO 33 Tiffin (1947)
Assembly Worker 12.8 (4035) PO 294 Barnes (1958)
Coil Winders 15.0 (3782) PO 27 Rothe & Nye(1958)
Craft 7.5 $2364 PO 61 Rothe & Nye (1958)
Machine Operators 11.7 $3688 PO 37 Rothe & Nye (1959)
Radial Drill Operator 25 $7881 CA Roche (1961)
Entry Level Steelworkers 13.7 (6064) WS 249 Arnold et al. (1983)
Entry Level Steelworkers 6.8 $3000 SHMM NA Rauschenberger (1986)
Armor Crewman 16.2 WS 374 Vineberg & Taylor (1972)
Pay Form: Unknown
Machine Operator 9.1 PO 76 Baumberger (1921)
Soap Wrappers 8.9 PO 30 Wyatt (1927)
Tile Sizing & Sorting 19.1 PO 18 Wyatt (1932)
Paper Sorters 8.7 PO 18 Hearnshaw (1937)
Lamp Shade Manufac. 8.6 (2805) PO 19 Stead & Shartle (1940)
Wool Pullers 15.1 (2256) PO 13 Lawshe (1948)
Machine Sewers 14.6 ( 1732) PO 100 Wechsler (1952)
Electrical Workers 12.7 (3279) PO 65 Wechsler (1952)
Cable Makers 17.7 (4596) PO 40 McCormick & Tiffin (1974)
Electrical Workers 14.1 (3638) PO 138 McCormick & Tiffin (1974)
Assemblers 19.6 (6095) PO 35 McCormick & Tiffin (1974)
14.0 $ 5062
Estimates of standard deviation of the output (SD$) of full time full year workers that
are presented in parenthesis were derived from coefficients of variation (CV) for output.
For jobs outside of mining, retailing and finance it was assumed that a more capable worker
would necessitate proportionately more materials, energy inputs, overhead labor inputs
but not necessitate additional capital. This means that the metric of the CV is K-L
productivity and thus that in manufacturing where the ratio of value added to compensation
is 1.51, a 10 percent gain in K-L productivity has a dollar value equal to about 15 percent
of compensation. Consequently, SD$j = CVj (GNP per full time equivalent worker in industry
k)(wagekj/(wagek) where wagekj = average wage of occupation j in industry k and wagek
is average wage in industry k. The ratio of occupation IIjllsearnings to the industry
average was derived from Table 2 of Occupation by Industry Subject Report of the 1980
Census.
Plant and System Operators
Nuclear Control Room Oper. 108 $277,850 S(D) 34 Dunnette et al. (1982)
Fossil Fuel Cont. Room Oper. 72 $155,340 S(D) 48 Dunnette et al. (1982)
Nuclear Plant Operator 105 $ 97,370 S(D) 19 Dunnette et al. (1982)
Fossil Fuel Plant Operator 61 $ 39,455 S(D) 20 Dunnette et al. (1982)
Hydro Plant Operator 53 $ 27,030 S(D) 31 Dunnette et al. (1982)
Refinery Head Operator $ 15,355 SE 19 Wroten (1984)
Outside Operator $ 14,356 SE 19 Wroten (1984)
Pump Operator $ 10,381 SE 17 Wroten (1984)
$ 91,020
Other Craft Workers
Welders-Refinery 37.3 $ 16,775 SE 14 Wroten (1984)
Handcraft Workers 17.1 $ 5,390 PO NA Evans (1940)
Drillers 31 $ 9,772 PO 11 Lawshe (1948)
Arc Welder 16.0 WS 49 U.S. Job Service (1966)
Radar Mechanics [1] 40.3 WS 107 Whipple (1969)
Radar Mechanics [2J 20.1 WS 51 Whipple (1969)
Welders 13.7 $ 5,039 PO 25 Rothe (1970)
Repairman 21.4 WS 385 Vineberg & Taylor (1972)
Outside Mechanic 48.4 $ 21. 800 SE 12 Wroten (1984)
Electrician 23 $ 12,539 SHMM 104 MacManus (1986)
Sheet Metal Worker 25 $ 11,696 SHMM 22 MacManus (1986)
Plumber 24 $ 11,856 SHMM 66 MacManus (1986)
Painter 24 $ 8,626 SHMM 41 MacManus (1986)
Meat CUtter 26 $ 7,778 SHMM 14 MacManus (1986)
Maintenance & Tool Room Jobs 46 SHMM Bolda (1985)
27.6 $ 12,399
Supervisors
Steel: Foreman (average) $ 67,923 SHMM 11 Rauschenberger (1985)
The data on electric utility industry was collected in 1981 so the inflation factor based
on the growth of utility wages and salaries per FTE is 1.30. The petroleum refinery
industry inflation factor since 1983 is 1.10. The steel industry inflation factor is
1.084 for 1985 vs. 1982.
Table 2
PRECISION PRODUCTION AND CRAFT OCCUPATIONS
C.V.
of
Output
(Incumb)
Standard
Deviation
in 1985
Dollars Method
Sample
Size Source
TABLE 3
CLERICAL
Routine Clerical Jobs
Telegraph Operator 13.2 PO 14 Baumberger (1920)
Machine Bookkeepers 8.4 PO 39 Hay (1943)
File Clerks 17.9 PO 61 Gaylord (1951)
Card Punch Operator 11.5 (2488) PO NA Klemmer & Lockhead (1962)
Proof Machine Operator 13.4 (2932) PO NA Klemmer & Lockhead (1962)
Typists 18.6 (3980) PO 616 Stead & Shartle (1962)
Card Punch Operator (Day) 10.7 (2278) PO 113 Stead & Shartle (1962)
Card Punch Operator 21.6 (4550) PO 62 Stead & Shartle (1962)
Card Punch Operator 12.9 (2746) PO 121 Stead & Shartle (1962)
Proofreader 18.5 WS 57 US Job Service (1972)
Telephone Operator 17.7 WS 1091 Gael et al. (1975a)
Mail Carriers 22.5 WS 374 US Postal Service (1981)
Mail Handlers 22.7 WS 373 US Postal Service (1981)
Clerical 25 $ 5529 S(M) 91 Burke (1985)
Customs Inspector 15.7 WS 188 Corts et al. (1977)
Meter Reader 18 $ 4481 SHMM 14 MacManus (1986)
Toll-Ticket Sorters 14.9 PO 13 Maier & Verser (1982)
16.7 $ 4934
Clerical with Decision Making
Supply Specialist 26.5 WS 394 Vineberg & Taylor (1977)
Mail Distribution 39.2 WS 417 US Postal Service (1981)
Claims Processor 28.5 $ 5111 CA 15 Ledvinka et al. (1983)
Claims Evaluators 24.5 $ 4896 PO 176 DeSimone et al. (1986)
" "
23.8 $ 3876 SHMM 27 II 11 11
Claims Authorizer 20.5 WS 233 Trattner et al (1977)
Ticket Agent 26 $ 8411 SHMM 9 MacManus (1986)
Head Teller - Bank
.illL $ 2369 SeT) Mathieu & Leonard (1986)
25.5 $ 8925
TABLE 4
MANAGERIAL, TECHNICAL, SALES AND SERVICE WORKERS
Technical
Computer Programmer
Budget Analyst
Park Ranger
Instrument Tech. - Refinery
Computer Programmer
Cartographic Technician
Managerial
Convenience Store Manager
Bank Branch Manager
Bank Operations Manager
High Level Sales
District Sales - Food Manu.
Insurance Salesman
District Sales Rep. Mfg.
Real Estpte Sales
Life Insurance Sales
Sales Clerk
Sales Clerks
Cashiers
Sales Clerks
Grocery Checker
Cashier Checker
Service
Cooks
Package Wrappers
Package Packers
Average of 3
Average of Service, Low
Clerical & Operatives
32
(47)
33
(20)
47
33.5
33.8
51
(35)
(14)
33.3
32
37.5
41.3
83
120
- 62.8
22.2
17 .3
47.3
19.3
43
29.8
21.4
24.1
16.4
20.6
17.3
$16550
$15062
$ 4828
$28720
$15888
$13668
$13967
$10064
$ 3122
($ 8958)-
$ 5219
$17529
$21271
$12453
(2807)
(2147)
(5734)
$11379
$ 5228
$ 4068
SHMM
SHMM
SHMM
SE
SHMM
WS
SHMM
S(T)
S(T)
SHMM
CA
GS
SHMM
GS
GS
WS
GS
WS
SHMM
WS
PO
PO
443
110
153
29
18
92
29
385
27
10
14
Schmidt et ale (1979)
Hunter & Schmidt (1982)
Schmidt et ale (1984)
Wroten (1984)
Rich & Boudreau (1986)
Campbell et ale (1973)
Weekley et ale (1985)
Mathieu & Leonard (1986)
Mathieu & Leonard (1986)
4
92
18
63
Cascio & Silbey (1979)
Babko (1983)
Burke & Frederick (1984)
MacManus (1986)
Brown (1981)
Stead & Shartle (1940)
Lawshe (1948)
Lawshe (1948)
US Job Service (1976)
MacManus (1986)
Vineberg & Taylor (1972)
Blum & Candee (1941)
Blum & Candee (1941)
Footnotes for Table 3
8The Programmer Aptitude Tests raw validity is .38 based on Schmidt,
Rosenberg and Hunter's (1980) validity generalization of data on 1299
programmers.
bThe estimate of GMA job performance raw validities for technical jobs
is based on 20 occupations and a total of 2417 cases. The estimate for
professional occupations is based on 2 occupations and a total of 109 cases.
Schmidt, Mack & Hunter classify the park ranger job as a level 3 job using
Hunters (1983) classification scheme. For a level 3 job the raw validity
of GMA is .28.
CGMA raw validity for managers is a simple average of 9 separate managerial
occupations from the GATB manual.
dThe raw validity estimate is from Churchill et al's "The Determinants
of Sales Person Performance: A Meta-Analysis" (1985) and is based on 44
studies which used objective company data with controls for environmental
conditions. Since actual sales data were used it is assumed that criterion
reliability is 1.0.
.Cascio and Silbey estimated the average compensation of sales personnel
to be $75 a day or $18000 a year in 1978. This was inflated to 1985 wage
levels by multiplying by 1.555 and then multiplied by CV to estimate SD$.
fBobko et al, SHMM type estimate of SD$ was $49&7 which is inflated to
1985 wage levels by multiplying by 1.174 the growth of wages and salaries
in the industry from 1982 to 1985.
~Pearlman, Schmidt, and Hunter 1980.
hValidity estimate for sales clerk jobs is an average of Ghiselli's estimate
(-.0&) and the mean of more recent studies (.14) is reported by Hunter
and Hunter (1984).
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